Q&A: Kevin Fahey
Written by Phil Kiver
GCT 2010 Volume: 1 Issue: 2 (August)
THE PROVIDER:
From Tug Boats to Mine Rollers
Kevin Fahey
Program Executive Officer
Combat Support and Combat Service Support
Kevin M. Fahey assumed his current duties as the program executive officer for Combat Support and Combat Service Support, Warren, Mich., in October 2008. Fahey, a native of Massachusetts, entered civil service in 1981 following graduation from the University of Massachusetts. Prior to assuming duties in Warren, Mr. Fahey served as the program executive officer Ground Combat Systems, as well as the deputy PEO for Ammunition in Picatinny Arsenal, N.J., with approximately 200 different programs and an operating budget of 3 billion dollars. The PEO-Ammo executes life cycle acquisition management of conventional ammunition and manages the Department of Defense Executive Agent for all services conventional ammunition.
In February 2000, Fahey entered Senior Executive Service and was assigned as the senior technical executive for Close Combat Armament Systems, U.S. Army Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command, Armament Research, Development and Engineering Center, at Picatinny Arsenal, N.J. His previous jobs include deputy project manager, Crusader after serving as the chief of the Systems Engineering and International Division for the Crusader Program, the Future Armored Resupply Vehicle (FARV) Program Development project office, and chief of Systems Engineering, the U.S. delegate to the international 155 mm Joint Ballistic Working Group, and the M119 Development project officer. Fahey began his civilian service career at Watervliet Arsenal, N.Y., working in quality before moving to Picatinny Arsenal in December 1987. Fahey graduated from the University of Massachusetts in 1981 with a Bachelor of Science degree in industrial engineering/operations research. Upon graduation from college, Fahey attended the Quality and Reliability intern program at the DARCOM Intern Training Center, Red River Army Depot, Texarkana, Texas. He has been the recipient of the Superior Civilian Service Award and has been inducted into the Honorable Order of Saint Barbara. He completed the Advanced Program Management Course at the Defense Systems Management College.
Kevin Fahey was interviewed by Phil Kiver, GCT Editor.
Q: Has the current organizational structure been in place long, and is it best optimized for the current support requirements? Do you anticipate any adjustments to that organization?
A: It has changed quite a bit since the war started, mainly because we have additional products. We have added the armored security vehicle [ASV] and mine resistant ambush protected [MRAP] vehicles, and not long ago we started the joint light tactical vehicle [JLTV] program. So we have had to make changes to accommodate for our portfolio growth. We have also reorganized over the last few years, and I think we are about “right” now—not that we probably won’t change as the portfolio changes.
PEO CS&CSS has over 350 programs—four project and 17 product managers—including several joint service programs. We concentrate on force projection equipment [i.e. bridging, combat engineer and material handling equipment, force sustainment systems, petroleum and water systems, and Army watercraft], joint combat support systems [i.e. JLTV, sets, kits, tools and outfits, and test measurement and diagnostic equipment], mine resistant ambush protected vehicles, route clearance vehicles, and tactical vehicles [light, medium and heavy].
Q: One of your more well-known acquisition programs is JLTV. What can you tell me about the status of the program, the test and evaluation of the offerings so far and what the next steps are?
A: The JLTV program is a program of record focused on a very large capability gap that has been identified over the past few years. The main role of light tactical trucks was to be able to carry payload, but because of all the up-armoring we have done and the electronics we’ve added to those vehicles, the main purpose of the tactical fleet is no longer there. We have given up payload mission requirements to ensure the simple safe transport of personnel from point A to point B and back. The main focus of the JLTV is to bring back the balance in performance, protection and payload, all wrapped in a transportable and expeditionary solution. This is a critical challenge: maintaining the survivability of the current fight, keeping it light, and getting back the payload we have given up.
Q: How confident are you in the development of JLTV?
A: I am real confident, as JLTV is consistent with the new acquisition process. I have been in this business for 30 years and I have never been associated with a program with a better acquisition structure. We are currently in a 27 month technology development phase, but technology development is really technology integration. The number one risk of any program is integrating all this “stuff” together. JLTV is on schedule—we just delivered the prototypes for test by the due date. What we have seen is what we expected; the vehicle is performing well, but the test is structured with the hardest aspects at the end. We still have to blow them up, and obviously you don’t want to do that early on the testing program.
Why do I say this program is structured perfectly? We work really well with the user community [i.e. Marine Corps Combat Development Command and the Army’s Combined Arms Support Command] to come up with what I would call very difficult requirements, with the idea to really push industry to fill this capability gap to see what they can do for us. We want to see what’s in the realm of the possible, what’s achievable. Because we have three competitors in the technology development phase, you are really going to see what they can come up with and do. At the end of fiscal year 2011 we will go through Milestone B and make a decision on the final requirements, and cost, schedule and performance metrics to ensure we deliver in-line with the schedule.
Q: The original MRAPs were delivered under a rapid acquisition process, from several manufacturers. What are the challenges you face now in supporting them for the long term? Is part of your strategy to have a single contractor be responsible for MRAP—and route clearance vehicles—support in Iraq and Afghanistan?
A: Obviously the number one metric of MRAP early on was to get as many lifesaving vehicles to theater as quickly as possible. One way to do that was to order many different versions of MRAPs. Some think of MRAP as one vehicle, when really it is many different versions of mine resistant ambush protected vehicles. The challenges are obvious; we ended up with a large amount of what we call ‘low density’ items. Sustaining these items becomes a challenge because you have different versions and different parts; mechanics have to know a lot of different things about many different vehicles.
Right now sustainment is our number one challenge, and it will continue to be a challenge for a very long time, as the Army is going to maximize MRAP vehicles. Currently our MRAP Joint Program Office [JPO] uses a hybrid government/contractor logistics support approach to maintain and sustain the fleet of MRAP vehicles in theater. The intent is to continue to use field service representatives while we develop initial organic capabilities, probably in FY11.
Q: Does your office support the foreign materiel sales efforts for MRAPS?
A: Yes. The sale of MRAPs to coalition partners is actually managed through the MRAP JPO construct and the Marine Corps Systems Command, and we have PEO CS&CSS personnel who work directly for the JPO MRAP. The FMS cases for MRAPs are handled under the JPO MRAP construct and have so far all been executed out of the JPO’s Quantico Office.
Q: Can you expand a little more on how the FMS program is progressing?
A: Sure. The MRAP International Programs team works with each international customer on vehicle configuration, production schedules, transportation, spare parts, training, performance specifications and other efforts on existing and new contracts. According to the JPO MRAP, there is increased interest for MRAP vehicles. Roughly 830 vehicles have been procured through FMS, with additional cases pending.
In addition, the JPO also is working through the use of other authorities to get these vehicles in the hands of our coalition partners, including: direct commercial sales, the Coalition Readiness Support Program [which the U.S. buys and then loans to allies], and the Iraq and Afghanistan Security Forces Fund—also called Section 1202—which allows for the loan of excess equipment to our allies.
Q: The M-ATV was developed specifically to take MRAP qualities and adapt them to a platform better suited for the geography of Afghanistan. How has the vehicle been performing, and has the original M-ATV configuration been modified to fit the environment after in-service evaluation?
A: The original MRAPs went through various modifications during actual field use in Iraq. We added armor and many other items during the first few months of usage. M-ATVs have not had and major modifications at all—just a few minor modifications—but for the most the vehicle has performed very well. M-ATV is performing very well in theater, even beyond what we had assessed. We really learned from a ‘systems’ perspective on how to do things better because of the original MRAP fielding. We’re constantly receiving positive feedback from our joint warfighters.
Q: Within the past few months, Oshkosh delivered the first FMTVs under their manufacture and are scheduled to begin production deliveries in October. How has the change in manufacturers worked out—and as a follow-on, will there be separate support contracts for the vehicles from each manufacturer?
A: It has worked out very well so far. Oshkosh continued to work ‘at risk’ as the contract was protested, and they are continuing to deliver vehicles on track for testing. As far as the basic system sustainability contract, we will have one with BAE Systems as long as they are in production and one with Oshkosh as part of the production contract—anything beyond that we have not made a decision. Remember, these trucks are organically supported, unlike MRAP.
Q: Looking at the HMMWV fleet, can you tell me roughly how much of the total fleet is deployed and how the OPTEMPO has affected the life of those vehicles in theater? Do you expect to keep acquiring HMMWVs to bridge the gap until a replacement platform is selected?
A: I don’t know how many of the complete fleet is deployed, but I can tell you in Iraq and Afghanistan there are about 20,000 HMMWVs. However, that number will decrease as we continue to provide more vehicles from the MRAP family, taking the place of the HMMWVs’ mission. Throughout the war [HMMWVs] have really gotten beat up quite a bit.
We have over 150,000 HMMWVs in the tactical fleet. I don’t think we are going to be buying vehicles to bridge the gap; however, we are still in the process of evaluating our HMMWV sustainment strategy. We do a lot more with these vehicles than just going to war. National security or going to Haiti to support disaster relief operations are both missions that can be done with un-armored HMMWVs; these vehicles will be around for a long time with recapitalization.
Q: What metrics does the PEO use to determine the levels of force protection technologies—such as blast mitigating seats, fire suppression systems, passive/active protection systems, addon armor, etc.—that are threshold requirements in your wheeled vehicles?
A: Metrics may not be the right word as it includes some sensitive information, but we do have ongoing intelligence assessments. We adapt and modify equipment consistent with wherever they are operating, in accordance with current threat levels and needs.
Q: You are responsible for the vehicle-borne mine detection equipment, but do you also manage the array of mine rollers, plows and other clearance and detection equipment for vehicles?
A: Yes and no. About 99 percent of that equipment is put on our vehicles. We take responsibility for the equipment once the integration is complete, but that the equipment originally comes from the product manager IED Defeat/Protect Force from PEO Ammunition. We work hand in hand with them as they design the next mine roller or Rhino, making sure we understand the power and interface requirements for the equipment. Once all of the equipment is put our vehicles we sustain and maintain it.
Q: With the constant demand for more communications and electronics onboard vehicles, how are you managing the requirement for additional power?
A: Every vehicle in our inventory has had to increase the power. On the MRAP and HMMWVS, we had to upgrade the alternators for more power. In the future with JLTV, there is an open architecture, digital backbone which will allow for a “plug and play” modular approach. When we developed the RFP [request for proposals] for JLTV, PEO Command Control Communications-Tactical gave us the direction so we could ensure their “stuff” fit into the new vehicles.
Q: Any closing thoughts about the work of the PEO?
A: The magnitude of the stuff we manage is everything from urinals to tug boats, and tactical vehicles to water purification systems. But our main focus today, for obvious reasons, is Iraq and Afghanistan. The question as we go into the future is, how do we maintain and sustain our portfolio as we have added so much capability to our forces because of the war? We are actively working with the Army Force Generation model. So as we rotate units, we can also rotate equipment. We need figure out how to manage the equipment so we can have a JLTV in New Orleans, Haiti or Afghanistan, and we can tailor that vehicle to support the mission at hand, meaning it doesn’t need the same suite of equipment for every mission. We need to continue moving into an A-kit/B-kit armor plan, where things can be scalable and switched out easily and quickly due to mission requirements. The bottom line is, we need to ensure our soldiers are getting the absolute best equipment in order to complete their mission safely and successfully. ♦